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Abstract
C. MARTIN CAVER: A Vindication of Feminist Identity Politics: Towards a 
Combaheean Response to Zerilli’s “Freedom-Centered Feminism”
(Under the direction of Susan Bickford)
This paper is primarily an extended critique and meditation on Linda Zerilli’s Feminism 
and The Abyss of Freedom.  In that remarkable text Zerilli attempts to move beyond the 
perennial debates of identity reification, deconstruction, and calls to a “strategic 
essentialism.”  Drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt, she helps us to refocus on the 
primacy of politics as an active doing instead of a rule-governed practice.  However, in so 
doing she downplays the work of feminists committed to just the sort of political 
engagement she champions, yet who insist on making claims based on identity.  I attempt 
to show that these identity claims should not be perceived as a rule which politics should 
follow, but as essentially political themselves.  Using the Combahee River Collective 
Statement as an illustration of this, I show how identity claims are not necessarily claims 
to privileged knowledge or preferential treatment, nor are they confining caricatures that 
lock their claimants in oppressive stereotypes, binding them to the recognition they seek.  
Instead, the Combahee River Collective shows how identity politics names the exclusion 
felt by specific identity groups and enacts a new political discourse where their 
perspective and their interests are taken seriously.
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The Caricaturization of Identity Politics 
 In a scene from Paddy Chayevsky's screenplay for The Hospital we witness a 
raucous community meeting about plans for a hospital expansion which would replace 
tenement housing with a drug treatment facility.  First, a Black man speaks out using 
Marxist critique to admonish “middle-class Black traitors and flunkies who are selling 
out the Black proletarians.”  Then a white woman rises, claiming the floor and shouting, 
“Let's get back to the abortion issue.  What the hell does the male establishment know 
about abortion?”  She is then cut off by a Black woman who demands, “Who the hell 
raised the issue of birth control?  The issue at hand is the control of drug addiction in this 
community...”1  This scene is one of many in the film that depicts, albeit in caricature, a 
loss of faith in the social movement politics of the 1960s and the rise of a more 
fragmentary identity politics.  I describe this scene here, because this paper (with the 
humblest of aspirations) attempts to  respond to a set of problems typically associated 
with identity politics in general and feminist politics in particular.  Generally, I want to 
counter the common understanding of identity politics which assumes that it is a 
separatist, exclusionary force that hinders progressive coalition-building.  Specifically, I 
want to respond to Linda Zerilli's path-breaking approach to feminist political thought, 
which invokes the work of Hannah Arendt to propose a way of sidestepping the problems 
associated with feminism as a form of identity politics. Drawing on Michel Foucault and 
the Combahee River Collective, I will seek to productively critique Zerilli's approach by 
                                                            
1 Chayefsky, Paddy. The Hospital. Shooting draft. 1971. Movie Script Source. 27 April 2013. 
<http://www.moviescriptsource.com/movie-script.php?id=192> 
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explaining how it mischaracterizes what second-wave feminists were doing when they 
asserted a politics of difference that took identity and experience as fundamental.  In so 
doing I hope to offer a vindication of sorts for the identity politics bemoaned by figures 
like Todd Gitlin, Richard Rorty, and Nancy Fraser.2   
 To begin I will reconstruct Zerilli's main arguments with regards to her theory of 
“freedom-centered feminism.”  This vision of politics is one which inspires even as it 
confounds.  In deceptively comprehensible prose she guides us through an analysis of 
Sexual Difference, the publication of the Italian feminist Milan Bookstore Collective.  
Here she argues that the Milan Collective exhibits precisely the type of feminist politics 
that could help us get beyond what she calls “the category of women debates” that have 
plagued feminist political thought ever since women of color and post-structuralists 
began mounting critiques of “woman” as a coherent, unified group.  Zerilli sees the Milan 
Collective as employing a new feminist practice of political judgment which is crucially 
productive in three ways.  First, it is not a form of identity politics, which she sees as 
anti-political in that it fractures political community (particularly on the left), ties us to 
the “what” of conscripted categories of injury instead of the “who” which distinguishes 
political actors, and makes authoritative epistemological claims instead of contingent 
political ones.  Second, her account of feminist political judgment is one that focuses on a 
non-sovereign conception of the subject, which seeks to take us out of the problems 
associated with treating women as a unified willing subject motivated to action by 
consciousness of injuries, and instead evnisions a feminist politics motivated by a desire 
                                                            
2 See for instance: Gitlin, Todd. The Twilight of Common Dreams (New York: Holt, 1996), Rorty, 
Richard. Achieving Our Country (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), and Fraser, Nancy. 
Justice Interruptus (New York: Routledge, 1996) 
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for feminist interlocutors, agnostic to the potential ends of such a practice.  Third her 
account leads us to rethink the nature of democratic political power, a power that enters 
the world when actors come together freely to inaugurate  political claims which build the 
world anew.  I will respond to this by raising a series of questions about the implications 
of her arguments and their efficacy.  Then I will seek answers to those questions by 
taking a close look at another feminist group, the Combahee River Collective.  By 
analyzing what the CRC was actually attempting to do in its theorizing, consciousness-
raising, and organizing work, I believe it will become apparent that Zerilli's project is 
quite valuable, but that it must be further extended in ways she does not seem to 
anticipate fully.  First, it must take into account the ways in which epistemological claims 
can themselves be seen as political.  Second, it must appreciate the ways in which 
political power is not only constituted by actors, but prefigured in the field in which 
action takes place. 
 What I hope to reclaim over the course of this paper is a feminism that overcomes 
the caricature of essentialism and dogmatism that has been foisted upon it.  What seems 
clear to me in reading the works of the CRC is that they mark a critical addition to the 
category of women debates which goes beyond questions of epistemology (of a right way 
to think about feminist politics) or an argument about which feminist theory (liberal, 
socialist, standpoint, radical, poststructural) most accurately articulates the oppression of 
“women.”  Instead, we can see in the CRC's political claims an epistemological 
perspective that had been denied them.  That this could be read in Zerillian terms (as a 
political judgment that affirms freedom without following a deductive logic) shows at 
once what is promising and problematic about her approach.  On the one hand we see it 
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shows how a vision of an “ungrounded claim to freedom” is so promising for feminist 
political thought.  This freedom is one enacted by nonsovereign  subjects (those reliant on 
one another for both perception of and action in the world) as they engage in judgments 
of the social objects and phenomena around them.  These judgments build the social 
world anew because they are unmediated by universal rules and as such they are 
contingent, not determinate.  For feminism this then holds the promise of making 
“women” a political subject that is claimed by feminists and that is enacted through 
judgments (and desire for those judgments) amongst them. However, we can also see 
how potentially problematic this vision might be in that by focusing primarily on a 
fundamental freedom, we lose sight of the ways in which feminism (even as identity 
politics) is also important as a vision of fundamental justice.  The CRC is integral in the 
illustration of this, because their claims were claims to have a claim, to matter, and to be 
heard as “levelly human,” while also Black, lesbian, feminist, critics of capitalism, and 
community activists.  Zerilli either misapprehends their claims as not fundamentally 
political or she is not fully cognizant of their c, and this shows all the more how the space 
in which such ungrounded/unqualified claims are made often needs to be 
foregrounded/qualified in order that such claims make sense and get a fair hearing.   
 
 
Zerilli and the Milan Collective's “Freedom-Centered Feminism”  
 Zerilli's objective in Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom is multiple.  At its most 
fundamental, however, it is an argument for a politics capable of moving past what she 
calls “the subject question” and the roadblock this question represents.  The subject 
question for Zerilli is a legacy of Enlightenment philosophy which perceives the 
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individual subject as inherently sovereign, capable of judging and willing by virtue of a 
perfectly free will.  Feminism, Zerilli tells us, has been entangled both with this ideal (“be 
it an 'I' against all others or an 'I' multiplied and extended into an omnipotent 'we'”) and 
its deconstruction (in which it becomes “both the limit and the condition of feminist 
politics”), but that in either case the space of politics is constricted (Zerilli 2005: 10-12).  
For Zerilli only a politics that moves beyond the subject question and accounts for the 
nonsovereign character of political action will rescue us from unproductive discourses on 
the “category of women,” “difference versus equality,” and “objectivity versus feminist 
epistemology.”  Moving beyond the subject question helps to sidestep each of these 
debates, because each of them perceives of women through the lens of a sovereign 
subject inherited from modern political theory.  Simply put, a feminism that moves 
beyond the subject question is the “freedom-centered feminism” which she wishes to 
inaugurate.  Drawing on Arendt, Zerilli proposes a perspective on feminism which 
centers on the plural nonsovereignty necessary for political judgment and political action, 
and which she thinks is denied by identity politics and facile claims of equality.  In what 
follows I will track these arguments with respect to the specific example of a “freedom-
centered feminism,” given by her lengthy analysis of the Italian feminist group known as 
the Milan Women's Bookstore Collective. 
 Zerilli's focus on the Milan Collective is two-fold.  First she sees them as having 
developed, a “feminist symbolization of sexual difference,” a way of relating to one 
another through self-chosen cultural images of women as free, authoritative interlocutors.  
Second, she sees them as practicing a form of political judgment that refuses to elide 
differences between women and instead sees female identity as a political claim, made 
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amongst women as a practice of feminism.  A feminist symbolization of sexual difference 
is integral to Zerilli's account of freedom-centered feminism, because it allows women to 
move beyond a politics of equality that is centered on (traditionally masculine) notions of 
sovereignty.  As Zerilli argues: 
In the absence of the practice and symbols of free horizontal social-symbolic 
relations among women, liberalism gives rise to the 'terrible invitation' to pursue 
freedom and equality with men by repudiating one's sexed body and one's 
affiliations with women.  This repudiation of sexed being, far from enabling 
female freedom, destroys it.  (97) 
 
How does this work?  For Zerilli and the Milan Collective, it seems that up to now 
women have either claimed equal rights as undifferentiated from men, thus denying their 
sexed identity; or they have insisted on a victimized identity “whose symbolic figuration 
is hegemonic” and “denies the existence of the female gender – only a 'female condition'' 
(102).  This female condition is an identity based on injury, “housewives, women with 
abortion problems, raped women,” and it is this identity that makes them 
undifferentiated, vis-à-vis the rest of society (100).  This claim that “all women are the 
same” within a patriarchal frame of reference is one with which the Combahee River 
Collective will take issue (95).   
 However, what this means for Zerilli and the Milan Collective is that society is let 
off the hook.  Either women's sexed difference is effaced and made compatible with 
equality (difference that does not make a difference), or women are recognized only as 
victims, which entails an endless “game” of recrimination politics without ever being 
taken seriously as “bearers of a desire that seeks social inscription but no reparation” 
(102).  For Zerilli and the Milan Collective it is paramount that women abjure reparation 
for two reasons.  First, because freedom lies elsewhere, through the figuration of women 
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as free outside of their subjection.  Second, because reparation is an unquenchable desire 
that goes so deep that it can never be fully compensated but only rationalized by society 
through endless episodes of non-threatening redress.  This idea that identity politics only 
consists in the re-inscription of injuries and the pursuit of a recriminative strategy 
designed to pursue reparation indefinitely is what I seek to combat here. 
 On Zerilli's account what feminist politics requires is neither the symbol of the 
heroic woman, which provides a superior and unattainable icon, nor the victim, which 
serves as a wretched and confining one (112).  Instead of these modes of figuration 
women must look to symbolic figures of “entrustment,” of “examples (not rules)” of a 
new symbolic order of “female origin,” which ground feminism in the “material and 
symbolic practice of free relations among women” (114).  These symbols of entrustment 
include “the biblical story of Ruth and Naomi,” “the relationship between the poet H.D. 
and Bryher in Greece,” and “the friendship between Virginia Woolf and Vita Sackville-
West, among other exemplary relationships between women” (114).  All of these are 
figures which symbolize for Zerilli and the Milan Collective a co-authorization, an 
acknowledgement of each other's desire for freedom, one that says “Go on … Go ahead” 
(114-115).  They are important and necessary because they represent a freedom prior to 
the consciousness of injury, oppression, and subjection (101).  They represent a 
knowledge that “makes consciousness possible” (101).  Zerilli states, “What allows a 
woman to become conscious of oppression, in other words, is not the bare fact or truth of 
oppression but a symbolic representation of female freedom” (101).   
 She describes this symbolic representation in various ways.  It is a “symbolic 
authorization” that women give to one another simply by attributing to each other the 
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authority of such symbols and by acknowledging their shared desire for this authority 
(115).  It is also “political work on the symbolic,” a “new symbolic practice,” whereby 
women look beyond recrimination, injury, and lack and towards a “something more” that 
is neither equality nor reparation but instead a desire for relations under these symbols of 
freedom (102).  It is a form of politics, a relationship founded in entrustment, and 
addressed to women by women.  This symbolic representation, this discursive politics, 
critically confronts women's differences through political judgment which it mediates not 
by a priori rules but through this symbolic representation of women   as authoritative 
female interlocutors.  The desire for this politics is the desire for a “power, a 'female plus' 
… that valorize[s] both the female gender and the individual woman in her difference 
from other women” (112).  In other words, symbolic representation is a judgment about 
what images of feminist politics are freedom-affirming, a judgment which is used to 
mediate the differences between women in light of these images.  It is a form of aesthetic 
political judgment that actively results in the (non-sovereign) feminist freedom it 
symbolically represents.  To paraphrase Richard Rorty, “It enacts the taste by which it 
will judge itself.”3 
 
  
Zerilli's Vision of Feminist Judgment 
 Zerilli draws heavily on an interpretation of Hannah Arendt's work to describe the 
form of political judgment she has in mind.  Following the Milan Collective she calls it a 
                                                            
3 Rorty writes about ironist literary heroes as those who “create the taste by which he will be judged.”  I 
see Zerilli making a similar invocation for her vision of feminism on the terrain of politics.  See Rorty, 
Richard. Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at p. 97 
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“practice of disparity” (110).  What is judgment as a “practice of disparity”?  It is a 
“necessary first step” in making the inequalities amongst women “speak in free social 
forms” (110).  Zerilli argues that, unlike a principle of equality, which serves to render 
women the same as men and other women; a “practice of disparity” preserves equality as 
a political claim, an “equalized” relation of unequals engineered from “outside” (111).  
Through this practice women judge one another and their status vis-à-vis men in relation 
to the symbolic representation of freedom discussed above.  This becomes a “third term,” 
a “tertium comparationis,” which maintains equality as something relational, a political 
judgment not about anything inherent in the objects being compared, but an active claim 
about the subjects making the comparison (111-112).  This politicization of equality (and 
inequality) allows pluralism to surface, as differences and judgments of those differences 
appear.  It thus troubles the “monologic” notion of a “'proper' feminist viewpoint and 
with it the unity of the group” (110).  However, while the security of ideological thinking 
may be lost, a world of “genuine interlocutors” comes to life.  According to Zerilli the 
interlocutors are: 
… those women who have preferences like and unlike mine, who see from a 
standpoint not identical with my own, and whose opinions I am called upon to 
judge or by whom my own dearly held opinions will be judged and perhaps 
unsettled even to the point of crisis.” (110) 
   
This mode of judgment, which is grounded neither on “doctrinal formulas or 
'argumentative logic,'” exists only through the “entrustment” of women to other women 
as they acknowledge and co-authorize each other's desire for freedom (111).  This 
“entrustment,” this acknowledgment, is enacted publicly as women express a grateful 
reciprocity towards one other, and thus engage in a new form of feminist politics.  This 
“freedom-centered” feminist politics encourages women to judge and be judged by other 
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women, to choose membership in a genealogy of women while maintaining individuality, 
and to transform the “I-will” of self-sovereign, masculinist, and “recriminative” politics 
into the “I-can” of non-sovereign, feminist, and “non-recriminative” politics of a 
promised community (117).  This promised community is literally promised; it is enacted 
– by women for one another – in the present.   
 The illustration Zerilli gives of this within the Milan Collective is the story of how 
its members began to judge one another during the compilation of what came to be 
known as the “Yellow Catalogue,” or “Catalogo giallo” (107).  This was a pamphlet on 
social interpretation which grew out of the reading of women's literature and the ways it 
facilitated the group's judgment of one another (107).  Here we learn of how, during a 
discussion of Jane Austen, one woman spoke out saying that “The mothers [who prevent 
their daughter's freedom] are not the writers; they are really here among us, because we 
are not all equals here” (108).  This statement, on their account, had the effect of making 
them feel freer, because it was one that liberated them from a vision of equality that was 
“neutral, genderless” and which “crushed every nonrecriminative female desire … and 
articulation of difference in the name of a commonality based on membership in an 
oppressed group” (108).  In turn they began to perceive themselves as unequal, different; 
but in ways that did not stymie their fledgling associational desires, which had always 
been there, obscured “underneath the so-called power conflicts between women as that 
which made them painful and endless,” as if through conflict the painful lack of robust 
associations could be overcome, rationalized (109).   
 Zerilli interprets this episode as exposing “a mode of difference that is irreducible 
to social differences (for example, gender, race, class, sexuality),” in other words, 
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“differences of taste” which could not compel agreement (109-110).  Focusing initially 
on the judgment of “prototypes” of female literary figures (and in turn the women making 
claims about these figures), the Milan women avoided idealizing either “the superior 
woman” associated with “the politics of equality” or “the wretch” associated with the 
politics of recrimination.  These “prototypes” were instead figures who simply “authorize 
those women who authorize them,” remaining always “subject to judgment, argument, 
and debate” (112-113).  These then gave way to the examples of “entrustment” 
mentioned above (Ruth and Naomi, H.D. and Bryher, Woolf and Sackville-West) as the 
figuration of an associational desire beyond social value (“the economy of use,” “the 
betterment of society”) became clearer (113).  For Zerilli this is the figuration of a radical 
claim to democratic participation, an associational desire that is “unqualified” in that it 
makes no reference to social utility.  She sees feminist politics then as an unqualified 
vision of women's freedom, untethered to rights, means-end logic, or any prevailing 
assumptions about what political questions are important.  She insists that this sort of 
freedom is  “always 'out of order'” (9).  
 
 
Zerilli and Second-wave Feminism 
 
 One of the main goals of this paper is to point out the ways in which Zerilli's 
approach to feminist political freedom may result in either a repetition or a compounding 
of some of the problems she associates with the “category of women” debates that serve 
as an impetus for her work.  To that end, I will here look specifically at her criticism of 
second-wave feminism and seek to point out what I take to be significant relationships 
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between her original arguments and those criticisms.  On my reading Zerilli makes three 
main critiques of second-wave feminism.  First, she argues that it presents a too-unified 
category of women as the subject of feminism (ix).  Second, she argues that this category 
and the implications therein is used to justify a “rule-governed theorizing” whereby 
theory is reduced to an anti-political form of deductive reasoning which she calls “the 
false security of epistemology” (48, 64).  Third, she argues that this form of theorizing 
results in the misguided attempt to pursue a feminist freedom through a (traditionally 
masculine) “fantasy of sovereignty” that is incapable of creating a space (through 
freedom as a world-building practice) where the category of women can be articulated as 
a “political relation” (20, 97).  While these criticisms are neither misguided nor poorly 
received, I will attempt here to explain why Zerilli’s critiques may lead her to 
misapprehend ways in which feminism as identity politics can be seen as not only world-
building and politically creative but also self-consciously contingent and anti-
epistemological. 
 To begin, Zerilli is of course right to point out that some first- and second-wave 
feminists considered the category of women to be fairly monolithic or at least as sharing 
some basic, uniform relationship to the power of men.  Zerilli herself, however, admits 
that the notion that second-wave feminism ever really held a coherent view of women as 
a group is itself suspect, stating that “the orientation provided by this putatively collective 
subject was illusory at best” (1).  Ultimately she does side with third-wave feminists who 
argue that “differences matter and the very category of identity itself is suspect” (20).  
This is certainly the right inclination to have (to problematize categorical accounts of 
identity), but slightly problematic in that it obscures the similarities between certain types 
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of second- and third- wave theorizing on the category of women.  Catherine MacKinnon 
for examples defines women as a constructed concept that nonetheless has real 
implications that must be taken into account.  MacKinnon argues that “since no woman is 
unaffected by whatever creates and destroys women as such, no woman is without stake 
in women's situation” (MacKinnon 38).  In this way, even one of the avatars of second-
wave feminist theory argues “women become defined politically” as “the congealed form 
of the sexualization of inequality between men and women (38, 1987: 6).  No less than 
Judith Butler herself claims to share resonances with this approach (Butler 1999, xii).  So 
to begin, the typical distinctions between second- and third- wave feminists may on 
closer examination give way to a more nuanced genealogy. 
 This sort of critique, however, is largely besides the point for Zerilli's purposes, 
because she is less concerned with the content of the so-called category of women 
debates (women as a coherent subject v. women as a subjected identity group) than with 
the mode of theorizing which fueled them.  She describes this as a desire on the part of 
both second- and third-wave feminists “to form universal concepts under which to 
subsume particulars in the name of predicting and achieving social change” (Zerilli 2005: 
34).  For second-wave feminists, then, an example of such a universal concept would 
include patriarchy, the strategic oppression of women for the maintenance of social 
power (MacKinnon 48).  What is problematic about the use of this concept on Zerilli's 
account is that it offers a pre-fabricated universal response to what should be the ongoing 
political contestation of particular claims, particular judgments.  She argues that “Second-
wave feminism tended to think about political claims as truth claims (that is, as claims 
that need to be and can be 'justified' in the epistemic sense of giving proofs)” (Zerilli 
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2009: 91). 
 This assertion is problematic for two reasons.  First, it overlooks the way in which 
some second-wave feminists saw their project in anti-dogmatic, non-deductive, inter-
subjective ways.  Second, it fails to perceive how the claims that Zerilli describes as 
“truth claims” are themselves self-consciously political.  This is the case, for instance, 
when they are the conscious choice of an epistemological perspective that grounds itself 
not on an objective (masculine) truth but on an intersubjectively constructed political 
reality.  Some second-wave feminists explicitly rejected the idea of objective truth 
claims, while for others, this rejection was implicit in the very self-consciously political 
claims they were making.  MacKinnon puts it thusly, “Truth is in a sense a collective 
experience of truth, in which 'knowledge' is assimilated to consciousness, a consciousness 
that exists as a reality in the world, not merely in the head” (MacKinnon 98).  What is 
important is that an adequate (intersubjective) account is given of the lived social reality 
of the world.  This move, from epistemology as scientific and objective to epistemology 
as situated and political, is significant.  It “contextualizes verification, rendering 
epistemology … 'the study of the life situation of consciousness, an inquiry which is 
ultimately political and historical” (99).  Moreover, not only is the epistemology itself 
politicized, but the choice of an epistemology is also revealed as political.  MacKinnon 
quotes Kuhn to argue that choosing an epistemology is “'like the choice between 
competing political institutions' because it is a choice of political institution – one that 
women never chose” (99).  Zerilli thus seems to downplay the political character of such 
“epistemic” claims-making, whose reasoning and justification is not deductive, but 
intersubjective. 
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 Finally, let me address the way Zerilli presents second-wave feminism as 
succumbing to a “fantasy of sovereignty” (10).  This critique goes beyond her critique of 
the method of second-wave feminism (as being epistemological) to the object of its 
thought, namely, a coherent, unified female subject.  Zerilli argues that even if second-
wave feminists criticized the political sovereignty of men as based on female submission, 
they were still “inclined towards a conception of freedom that either sets the individual 
woman against 'all her sex' … or required a woman's full identification with 'her sex' ...” 
(10).  In other words, women combated a male, “objective” sovereign subject with a 
female version, one that either ignored sexual difference so as to attain the universal ideal 
of the male subject (“the exceptional woman”) or one that emphasized sexual difference 
but only within an equally sovereign, unified category of women (10).  What is 
problematic for Zerilli is that by focusing on sex inequality instead of freedom, women 
bought into an ideal of the merely willing subject, whose sovereignty requires that it 
remain unrestrained and unitary.  Thus they lost sight of an ideal of the doing subject, 
whose nonsovereignty both requires and enables it to speak and act with others in light of 
the plurality of each’s perspective, and in so doing to engage in politics, building up the 
world.  The latter takes primacy for Zerilli, because without it we relegate ourselves to a 
politics that is “instrumental and adjudicative,” one that theorizes deductive, universal 
rules to which the intrinsic particularity of politics is then subsumed (10).  This type of 
politics “minimizes the possibility of freedom as action” (10).  In other words, it loses 
sight of the way that freedom, an uncoerced concerted activity which builds the world 
anew, is conditioned by our plurality, our individual inadequacy to act politically.  Our 
focus, following Zerilli, should not be on the question of the subject but on the question 
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of the world: how non-sovereign subjects build the world through their judgments and 
actions, and how they create the space in which things can become politicized. 
 Maintaining a concept of freedom based on the political relations of non-
sovereign, plural subjects is no doubt crucial if we are to move beyond a politics 
primarily concerned with use-value and means-ends reasoning.  However, it is also 
important not to misapprehend two important aspects of feminist identity politics.  On the 
one hand, we can see ways in which the pursuit of justice on behalf of one identity group 
can be a liberating preface to a fuller democratic politics amongst the entire citizenry.  On 
the other hand, we can see how claims about identity can be both epistemological and 
world-building.  First, following Hannah Pitkin’s subtle critique of Arendt, we can see, 
for example, how Zerilli’s similar marginalization of justice claims within politics might 
be re-thought.  Pitkin argues that politics motivated by private interest need not preclude 
freedom in the Arendtian/Zerillian sense because participation changes us to become 
more aware of shared standards and our stake in them as an “I want” becomes an “I am 
entitled to” (Pitkin 347).  Pitkin also argues that politics motivated by what once seemed 
merely “personal troubles” can help redefine political community (“build the world”) as 
we learn how our interests are “embedded in social relationships” and as we “discover the 
value of public institutions” (348).  Pitkin specifically gives an example of a housewife 
“who learns for the first time that she is not alone … that what troubles her is part of a 
social structure that can be altered” (348).  This vision of the way that questions of social 
justice can fit with an Arendtian conception of freedom (as potentially generative, as part 
of the groundwork by which freedom can take place) stands in stark contrast to Zerilli.  
While she admits that “the rise of the social … and the entanglement of women in it  … 
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is an established fact,” she sees this fact much more pessimistically than Pitkin as a 
“politically problematic inheritance,” that which might cause “the value of expediency to 
trump claims to freedom” (Zerilli 2005: 8,9).  However, in light of Pitkin’s work, I 
question the force of this pessimism. 
Second, claims regarding women’s identity seem to be more diverse than Zerilli 
wishes to allow.  As she describes them they only serve to entrench a sovereign notion of 
the subject (12).  On this account claims of identity are either claims of recognition meant 
to repair the female subject to full political existence as a (negatively free) willing agent, 
or they are the multiplication of identical sovereign wills into a singular (still negatively 
free) collectively willing agent (10,12).  In either case plurality, the “condition of 
politics,” the acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the individual to act politically, is 
lost.  However, the identity claims which came out of consciousness-raising were by no 
means a sovereign “I” “multiplied and extended to an omnipotent “we” (10).  These were 
spaces of contestation of challenge, of new knowledge.  Kathie Sarachild writes how 
conscious-raising sessions were often disruptive and interruptive, explored tangents, and 
were not primarily a therapeutic strategy, a space to be nice and tolerant of everyone, but 
were a specific process “to get closer to the [intersubjective, not objective] truth” of the 
condition of women in a world marked by patriarchy (Sarahchild 148).  Likewise, 
Catherine MacKinnon says consciousness-raising, by “socializing women’s knowing,” is 
“the collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of women’s social experience, as 
women live through it” (MacKinnon 83).  She describes it elsewhere as a “face-to-face 
social experience that strikes at the fabric of meaning of social relations between and 
among women and men by calling their givenness into question and reconstituting their 
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meaning” (95).  This seems to be every bit the world-building project Zerilli has in mind.  
Let us look at an illustration Zerilli gives in order see the divergence between her 
theory and consciousness-raising.  Here she describes an example from Arendt of people 
sitting around a table (Zerilli 2005, 19).  The table is important, because it is a worldly 
object that both “relates and separates men at the same time,” and this space, this worldly 
in-between, is where politics occurs.  It is not given, but chosen, ultimately created 
through our judgments (otherwise we might sit on the table instead of at the table).  The 
crisis in contemporary feminism for Zerilli is like the crisis of modernity for Arendt, 
because they are both marked by a loss of this common worldly in-between, objects that 
can highlight women’s differences and yet remain shared in common so as to relate them 
to one another.  For Zerilli the problem with second-wave feminism is that it believed 
that gender identity could serve as the worldly in-between that relates women politically 
(20).  However on her account, gender identity cannot become political, cannot be 
politicized, unless women see their claims as fundamentally free, prior to any question of 
their subjectivity or social value.  Thus, Zerilli argues that the identity of women based 
on injury and victimization, which she believes characterized second-wave feminism, 
does not suffice as a political relation that affirms freedom (100).  Instead of a category 
of woman that has as its primary figuration (in the words of the Milan Collective) “the 
wretchedness of the female gender,” “the housewives, women with abortion problems, 
raped women,” on Zerilli’s account women can create the worldly in-between of politics 
simply through a freely chosen figuration of women as authoritative interlocutors and a 
shared desire for such co-authorization (100).  In so doing they claim “women” as the 
political subject of feminist politics.   
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What I wish to argue is that this project is well-intentioned but problematic for 
two reasons.  First, it does not respond to those who thought second-wave feminism was 
exclusionary to some women.  In fact, given that this approach primarily focuses on the 
freedom to make claims and not the social and material conditions of women vis-à-vis 
men (and other women) it may be even more exclusionary.  Would women who felt 
excluded or voiceless within second-wave feminism feel more at home in a context 
where the ability to make claims (perhaps as inflammatory as one Milan Collective 
member's “I don’t care at all about the women who must deal with abortions”) is 
regarded as a more important source of freedom than the freedom that comes from the 
critical recognition of forms of inequality and shared struggle?  Feminist politics has 
suffered perhaps from a lack of shared priorities and tactics, something common in any 
mass movement.  However, it remains unclear why the choice of gender and the 
differentiated social and political conditions that term implied for many second-wave 
feminists is not an equally valid world-building political relation as Zerilli’s ideal of self-
authorized figurations.  
Secondly and relatedly, we could say that if other feminist projects suffer from a 
“fantasy of sovereignty” then Zerilli’s suffers from a “fantasy of efficacy.”  What this 
means is that Zerilli’s approach brushes aside questions about how to make claims upon 
men or anyone who is not willing to hear such claims and respond in turn.  While Zerilli 
acknowledges the existence of “the formal public realm … protected by law,” for her it is 
more important to understand that nothing guarantees or eliminates any particular space 
of appearance as a sight of politics and thus freedom (20).  She celebrates, for instance, 
the way second-wave feminists created political spaces out of “coffeehouses, living 
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rooms, kitchens, and street corners” (20).  That they were creating a politics seems more 
crucial to Zerilli, however, than why they were engaging in these actions, meeting in 
these places.  This was not only because they did not have easy access to institutional 
channels of power, but also because they shared in the revelation that the private realm 
needed to be publicized, that within the context of sex inequality, the public/private 
distinction merely served to reinforce patriarchal domination.  Second-wave feminists 
recognized that both institutional (public) and non-institutional (private) sites were spaces 
where political power is felt, and they attempted to combat the domination they 
experienced in both realms through both an enacted politics to which Zerilli gives 
primacy and a discursive politics she sees as secondary.  Second-wave feminists desired 
to mobilize women in order to change not only the social oppression which isolated them 
from one another and inhibited their ability to enact their political freedom, but they also 
mobilized to challenge the sex inequality within the institutions that enforced this 
inequality and which disguised it as neutrality and objectivity.  On Zerilli’s account of 
feminism, where politics occurs between women in the name of women, how is 
inequality between women and men ever adequately addressed?  On Zerilli’s account this 
inequality, this patriarchy, is set aside and women are tasked with enacting their freedom 
despite its existence.  Yet we must ask then what kind of freedom is enacted as such?  Is 
this not an other-worldly freedom, similar perhaps to the superiority of the German Jews 
described by Arendt who refused identification as Jews, a “superiority of a more or less 
well-equipped cloud-cuckoo land” (Arendt 1968, 18)?  
Returning to the analogy of the table, second-wave feminism saw through the 
practice of consciousness-raising not an objective truth, not a rule by which to practice 
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politics, but a series of inequalities which conditioned their lives.  On the Arendtian 
analogy it would be like discovering that the table, the worldly in-between, was skewed 
towards others or that you were at a different table, belonging to a different world 
altogether.  Feminists can and should choose for themselves a worldly in-between which 
they enact through politics, but they will ultimately also have to reckon with the (publicly 
and privately) institutionalized worldly in-between of extant (patriarchal) politics, make 
judgments about it, and make claims on it.  From the two points I attempt to show here, 
we can see how Zerilli’s project may actually exacerbate what is thought to be a 
shortcoming of second-wave feminism (its lack of attunement to difference), while 
diminishing what it is generally thought to have inaugurated.  This would include a 
greater awareness of sex inequality, a consciousness of the political effects of patriarchy 
on women’s lived experiences, and a politics that directly confronted masculine 
conceptions of freedom.  It attempted to do this not with its own vision of sovereignty, 
but through a practice of world-building consciousness-raising. 
One potentially fruitful illustration of my arguments lies in the writings of another 
feminist political group, the Combahee River Collective.  The CRC presents potentially 
significant qualifications to Zerilli's approach, in that it shows the ways in which her 
categorization of freedom relies on having women willing to participate as interlocutors, 
willing to have their views “challenged to the point of crisis,” and willing to tolerate deep 
diversities of feminist desires and projects.  They show that the vision of women's 
liberation inaugurated in their “Statement” was not a quest for misguided sovereignty, but 
instead a quest for a justifiable authority; not for the freedom of an unmoved mover, but 
the freedom of an equal participant.  Their Statement is neither an “I-will” nor an “I-can,” 
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it is a “We-shall.”  Furthermore they offer a broader vision of how feminism fits into the 
world around them.  They address their project not just to each other, but to all audiences, 
seeing the inequality they experience as bound up with other forms of inequalities and 
oppression.  Finally they may help shed light on the way that the symbolization of 
feminist freedom may need to be rethought, so that sexual difference, the attribute which 
Zerilli describes as applying to women “who make a political claim to membership in a 
genealogy of women,” can have the potential to apply to all women.  In other words, the 
CRC may help us see how an ungrounded politics motivated solely by the desire for 
freedom without regard to how this freedom is constituted is already sneaking a form of 
(non)judgment into its practice, and that this formulation may be exhilarating for some 
and oppressive for others. 
 
 
The Combahee River Collective and “The Truth That Never Hurts”  
 The Combahee River Collective came together as a branch of the National Black 
Feminist Organization (NBFO) in Boston in the early 1970s.  Disillusioned with the 
infighting of the NBFO and its more reformist and heteronormative organizational 
approach, the Combahee River Collective decided to strike out in a new direction, taking 
their name from the site in South Carolina where Harriet Tubman helped to organize and 
lead a military offensive in which 750 slaves were able to escape to freedom (Harris 
2001: 294).  Barbara Smith, one of the founding members of the Combahee River 
Collective, is quoted as describing the feeling she got from the political organizing and 
consciousness-raising retreats as having been “the first time that I could be all of who I 
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was in the same place” (Harris 1999: 10).  The Collective met for several retreats 
beginning in the late 1970s until they disbanded in 1981 (Harris 295, Smith 1998: 171).  
Besides serving as a supportive space for consciousness-raising and reflection, the group 
and its members also organized around several political issues, most significantly a string 
of murders targeting women, which led them to produce the pamphlet “Six Black 
Women, Why Did They Die” and subsequently organize community meetings and 
political coalitions with other feminist groups (Harris 299).  This pamphlet and their 
response indicated a concern to not only publicize what was happening (and which media 
outlets had largely ignored), but also to empower women with a message combining 
practical knowledge about self-defense with the insight that the violence in their 
communities had its roots in both racism and sexism.4  Later, their “Statement,” in which 
they formally laid out the Collective's political perspective, would elucidate this unique 
form of marginalization facing Black women in terms of “interlocking oppressions,” and 
in so doing inaugurate an “identity politics” which grows out of this shared experience.  
Barbara Smith calls this recognition of one another's shared identity and its continued 
presence in the world “the truth that never hurts” (Smith 72). 
 I will present three main critiques of Zerrili's approach to feminist politics using 
the analytic perspective of the Combahee River Collective.  These critiques arise in 
relation to Zerilli's account of identity politics, her conceptualization of political action 
and its motivations, and finally her depiction of political power and in what it consists.  I 
will use the Statement of the Combahee River Collective somewhat as a foil for Zerilli's 
own appropriation of the Milan Collective's Sexual Difference.  I hope to offer a counter-
                                                            
4 “Six Black Women, Why Did They Die?” Combahee River Collective, reprinted in Radical America, 
vol. 13, no. 6, 1979, pp. 44-46 (accessible via http://dl.lib.brown.edu/pdfs/1124979008226934.pdf) 
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narrative about identity politics, one that focuses on what inspires identity groups to 
action, and the nexus of power into which they act.  I will argue, for instance, that 
identity politics does not entail perforce the reparative conundrum which is so troubling 
to Zerilli.  As a matter of fact, we may be able to think of identity politics in rather 
Zerillian terms.  However, this will require us to rethink the conceptualizations of 
political action and political power offered by Zerilli and broaden them.  Namely, by 
looking at the political organizing of the Combahee River Collective we can see that 
politics (“understood as a relation of no-rule that depends on the presence of others”) is 
fully compatible with social concerns and claims of justice (Zerilli 2005: 21).  Likewise 
power, which Zerilli (drawing on Arendt) understands as “that which 'springs up between 
men when they act together and vanishes when they disperse'” has to be more 
thoughtfully brought into conversation with the Foucauldian account of power relations 
as “a mode of action upon the actions of others” (Zerilli 21, Foucault 2000: 341). 
 
 
Identity Politics as Neither Reparative nor Epistemological 
 Beginning then, with the Combahee River Collective's Statement, we can see it is 
a manifesto of sorts for identity politics.  However, identity politics on this account is not 
an essentialist judgment of what politics, what reparation, is necessitated by certain 
identities (although it has been interpreted as such).  Identity politics here is a judgment 
about politics, namely that it occurs in a field conditioned by “interlocking oppressions” 
and that as Black lesbian feminists marginalized from other social movements, their 
experiences of identity open up a “potentially most radical politics” (“Statement,” 212).  
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It is not, then, an epistemological judgment about identity (what should be afforded 
people on the basis of their identity, how we define identity, or what group is most 
deserving).  It is the judgment that a claim to be recognized as “levelly human” within a 
field of politics that marginalizes certain races, sexes, sexualities, and classes is a radical 
one.  It is simply an extension of principles of equality, justice, and the analytic lenses of 
feminism and Marxism to the lived experiences of Black women.  These experiences 
“condition” but do not “determine” their lives (otherwise there would be no struggle 
against them).  The CRC sum this up by saying:  
The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we 
are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class 
oppression, and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis 
and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are 
interlocking.  The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our 
lives.  (CRC 210) 
 
I read this not as invective but as corrective.  Identity politics here is not some striving 
towards the fantasy of a sovereign subjectivity, but is an intersubjective awareness of 
unequal power relations between different publics.  Such an awareness cannot happen in 
isolation.  Instead, one needs others to substantiate it, verify it.  The CRC, for instance, 
writes how “Black feminists often talk about their feelings of craziness before becoming 
conscious of the concepts of sexual politics...” (CRC 211).  This sort of claim is less 
about seeking reparation from others and more about inaugurating a political space for 
and by Black lesbian feminists.  It is one which had not been possible in their 
associations with other organizations, yet it was one which was imperative in order for 
them to adequately express themselves, to be taken seriously as interlocutors.  On this 
view the CRC are simply trying to inaugurate a world-building politics in the shadow of 
other publics from which they have been excluded. 
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 In this sense, we might think that Zerilli, who appropriates Arendt to explain the 
somewhat separatist feminist politics of the Milan Collective, would be willing to 
interpret the politics of the CRC in similar fashion.  However Zerilli does not regard 
identity politics in this way.  She sees it as primarily the re-inscription of a recriminative 
standpoint, a new “rule” by which to measure political claims.  She argues that feminism 
as identity politics gets “caught in a vicious circle, [whereby] the subject's political 
demand for recognition and reparation repeats, in the form of a compulsion, the very 
experience of injury that subjugates (but also constitutes) that same subject (Zerilli 100).  
She argues that feminism (second-wave/identity-based) has the tendency to confuse 
politics with fabrication, whereby politics becomes the application of a total theory, the 
achievement of a master plan, and political subjects are transformed into the passive 
objects, the raw materials, of a worldview which prefigures their interests and their 
claims (36).  Zerilli then draws on Arendt to claim that, contra this view of politics as a 
“form of fabrication or making,” politics is instead fundamentally active, a practice, not a 
theory (37).  She says with Arendt “Political actors know not what they do … because 
when we act, we cannot know (predict or foresee) what the consequences of our action 
will be” (37).  And yet, even though political actors cannot in this sense “know what they 
[will have] do[ne],” why should that stop political actors from explaining their intentions 
in terms of shared political judgments?   
 What if we think of feminism, not as the application of a theory of politics to 
political discourse, but as making a political claim to a theoretical perspective, responsive 
to their experiences?  Such a claim is political, because it argues that identities, subjects, 
and even the way we theorize about politics has been created by relations of power, and it 
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is a judgment that these relations of power are unequal, must be made more reversible 
through recourse to alternative theoretical perspectives.  Such a view of feminism could 
reconcile Zerilli's problematization of the phrase “the personal is political.”  She argues 
that this claim implies that every instance of power relations is an instance of politics.  
The claim, “when it identifies power with politics, risks effacing the very special 
character of democratic politics and also underestimating the possibility that it could be 
driven out of the world” (23).  However, it is not clear when we look at feminism as the 
claim to a claim, to a perspective, why this would risk effacing democratic politics.  
 Zerilli's objections to identity politics and the Foucauldian view of power relations 
as always already political are related.  On the one hand, Zerilli distinguishes between 
political claims which seek to solicit agreement (aesthetic judgments) and those that seek 
to compel agreement (logical arguments, claims from identity).  She argues that the latter 
cannot be thought of properly as political claims, because they do not take into account 
human plurality, and the world-building qualities of politics.  She would probably argue 
that the CRC's statement is one that gives a justification to compel others to agreement.  
Something like, our community is given in our experience, our identity, experiences and 
identities which are necessary to speak in the name of Black feminists.  I see two 
problems with this reading of the the CRC Statement.  First, by seeing this claim as only 
epistemic, whereby (according to Zerilli) the category secures the ability to make 
political claims, we fail to take note that the announcing of the category itself, the 
creation of the category, the claim to a category, is a political act, not just a philosophic 
one.  Second, we lose sight of the way that while the naming of oppression is deeply 
experiential, neither feminist politics nor Black feminist politics are “given” by those 
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experiences.  Instead they are constituted by a political and world-building response to 
them.  This is often referred to as consciousness-raising.   
 On the other hand, Zerilli in making her argument that the term “the personal is 
political” is often misused or misinterpreted, seems willing to exclude notions of other 
forms of power from political discourse.  She states, “What makes a claim political is not 
something that inheres in the object or the practice that the claim is about” (Zerilli 2009: 
92).”  For example she aruges, “I think we do better to interpret that slogan ['the personal 
is political'] as productive of the political character of the gendered division of labor.  
There is nothing intrinsically political about housework, sexuality, or reproduction” (92).  
But what if we see second-wave feminists' claim not as arguing that there is anything 
intrinsically political about these objects and practices but that patriarchy (and racism, 
heterosexism, and capitalism according to the CRC) had made them thusly.  Theirs was 
not an essential claim, but a first-order claim to apprehend the political structure of 
society as shaping these objects and practices in profoundly political (and oppressive) 
ways.  I think this difference is significant.  The CRC states, “We had no way of 
conceptualizing what was so apparent to us, what we knew was really happening” (211).  
And later, “A political contribution which we feel we have already made is the expansion 
of the feminist principle that the personal is political” (213).  Zerilli, following Arendt, 
seems to worry that by paying attention to the ways in which power circulates, produces 
subjects and points of resistance, we lose sight of the way that political relations and 
discourse are world-productive, can create the world anew (Zerilli 2005: 21-23).  But 
when we look at the CRC we see them very much creating a new world.  They were able 
to organize together with interests they made political through public articulation and 
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through a shared judgment that patriarchy, racism, heterosexism, and capitalism had 
helped to make their life experiences in Zerilli's terms “the object of a dispute … the 
occasion for the speech and action with which people create the common world, the 
space in which things become public, and create it anew” (23). 
 
 
Feminist Motivations and Foundings 
 The motivation and genesis of second-wave (and subsequent Black feminist) 
political thought was not epistemological, a politics justified on the epistemological 
ground of the category of women.  The CRC shows us that it was instead motivated by a 
shared first-order political judgment, the judgment in favor of an epistemological 
perspective that recognizes the power of patriarchy and its connection to other forms of 
oppression.  The CRC states, “There is also undeniably a personal genesis for Black 
feminism, that is, the political realization that comes from the seemingly personal 
experiences of individual Black women's lives” (CRC 211).  Why should we read this as 
epistemological in the sense Zerilli sees it?  Where do we find a rule being applied as a 
universally compelling guarantee of correctness?  Why is this not anything other than a 
“political realization” (intersubjectively formulated) that is guided not by an a priori rule, 
but a motivating principle.  It is a communal, political judgment that makes a claim to a 
new thinking about the world, namely that in light of the experiences shared by Black 
feminists and the political reflection upon them, a new politics should be inaugurated.  It 
is a claim to have a claim.  It is a judgment that their should be a judgment.  It is an action 
that seeks to elicit similar actions. 
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 Whereas the Milan Collective makes a claim to other women for a shared idea of 
“women” as politically constructed, the CRC makes a claim to all readers to be 
recognized as “levelly human.”  Their form of political judgment does not spring from 
the symbolic but from the lived.  “We believe that the most profound and potentially 
most radical politics come directly from our own identity, as opposed to working to end 
someone else's oppression.”5  Likewise Zerilli wants to shift from thinking of women as 
an identity category to thinking about women as the political subject of feminism, 
brought into existence by speaking in the name of women (Zerilli 166).  The CRC show 
that women cannot be conceived of as a political subject until there is a realization that 
they are also treated as a political object, an identity, shaped by power and oppression, 
different women in different ways.  They seek to point out that one should not simply 
voice a claim to women without first taking this into account, not as a rule to be followed, 
but as a political judgment in and of itself to be shared.   
 Zerilli says that the freedom she envisions is not a property of the subject, “not the 
freedom of will whose goal is sovereignty,” but a freedom experienced as “world-
building,” “in being with others and acting in public space” (91).  The CRC states plainly, 
“our liberation is a necessity not as an adjunct to somebody else's but because of our need 
as human persons for autonomy” (212).  Sovereignty of the will is different from 
personal autonomy.  It is personal autonomy gone imperial.  Instead of simply the 
presence of a will, of having a personal, private space shaped by contexts yet still 
individual, sovereignty of the will sees agency as completely controlled by our will and 
as acting solely in response to its demands.  Freedom thus relates to sovereignty and 
                                                            
5 Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” in This Bridge Called My Back. Latham, 
NY: Kitchen Table, Women of Color Press, 1982. p. 212 
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autonomy in ways that do not seem fully theorized (or experienced) by Zerilli.  As 
Sharon Krause puts it “Agency does not need a sovereign self, but it does need a self” 
(Krause 4).  Zerilli's worries about thinking of politics as a space where subjects with 
sovereign wills engage with one another as a means to an end, namely to get more 
(negative) freedom is reasonable.  But her vision of politics as an activity by which non-
sovereign actors practice freedom through claims-making which may or may not garner 
assent, assumes that such actors have personal autonomy.  The CRC's claim then, viewed 
from this perspective, is not that the category “women” does not include them, but that 
the way it has been politically constructed was such that it included Black women only as 
adjuncts.  In order to make a claim to political freedom, they first had to claim their own 
autonomy, their own selves, which they found through the exchange of perspectives with 
one another in the practice of consciousness-raising. 
 Another problem for Zerilli also seems to be that, among political claims that 
solicit, that anticipate and posit assent, she does not distinguish between those that are 
and are not intelligible.  The CRC seems to argue that in order to have meaning at all, the 
category “women” must be qualified, must be used carefully, otherwise Zerilli's project 
simply repeats the mistakes of the past with impunity.  As the CRC states, “Black, other 
Third World, and working women have been involved in the feminist movement from its 
start, but both outside reactionary forces and racism and elitism within the movement 
itself have served to obscure our participation (211).”  What does the constitution of 
women as a political category instead of a supposedly epistemological one gain us if the 
same forms of hegemonic politics arise as before?  As Zerilli herself states the freedom 
she envisions has always been part of the first-order political claims-making of the 
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feminist movement.  Perhaps it is not simply a new attunement to freedom that is needed 
but also a concomitant attunement to the way that the practice of freedom can be just or 
unjust.  For instance, certain privileges might make the public in which you practice your 
freedom more visible than others, more hegemonic than others, perhaps more effective 
than others.  My point is that once we acknowledge the space of political action is 
constituted and conditioned by human plurality, then to have any meaning a claim must 
be intelligible (if not to those it addresses, then at least those in whose name it is made), 
and implied in this intelligibility is the cognizance of what politics requires in a given 
setting.  In the context in which the CRC was active (and in which many Black feminists 
still act) the “practice of freedom” by some could ignore the very material reality which 
constitutes different groups' identities and in practice could preclude the possibility of a 
shared political discourse.  Take, for instance, a recent example involving so-called “slut 
walks” in major cities worldwide.6  Groups of predominately white feminists decided to 
publicly march while subverting typical norms of dress in order to protest rape culture 
and gender violence.  They received a great deal of media attention.  Some Black 
feminist organizations responded by publishing open letters explaining why they would 
not participate in these sorts of actions and why the premise of these actions were 
offensive.  One in particular from a group called the Crunk Feminist Collective sums up 
these insights quite nicely.  Here they argue: 
While white women often want to deploy “woman” as a universal category and 
have the nerve to get angry and defensive when Black women like myself point 
out differences in our experiences, it is Black women themselves who have 
demonstrated what it really means to care about women as a group. For we put 
our bodies and our psyches on the line to show up at events called “Slutwalks” 
knowing that we are both more vulnerable to the same violence that brought other 
                                                            
6 A good overview of this topic can be found here: http://www.theroot.com/views/slutwalk-signs 
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women there and yet that we have little social privilege and power to reclaim the 
terms in the ways that many of the others marchers do … So, too, our histories 
with feminism. (“I Saw the Sign…,” 2011) 
 
This response, however, went largely unappreciated by either slut walk organizers or the 
media, and yet, for a time the “slut walkers” became a visible political subject of 
feminism. 
 Ultimately, Zerilli's account of politics seems to raise questions as to the desire for 
distinctively feminist politics as such.  For if our vision of political practice is one where 
we are guided by an unqualified claim to political freedom, one where we refuse to 
“cover over the abyss of freedom” with claims from identity, why would we be engaged 
in anything particularly feminist per se?  As Zerilli states, “Female freedom is radically 
ungrounded: neither foundationalist nor consequentialist, its only raison d'être is itself” 
(97).  If feminism is an ungrounded politics of unqualified claims, why is it feminist?  On 
this account feminist politics is just something that “women” (conceived as a political 
claim) simply do because they desire a political category of women, the creation of which 
enacts their participation in public affairs and nondomination.  But then why “women” 
and not “humans,” say, or some other category?  On this account there is no reason to 
think “women” in a feminist context might not be “men” in another context.  There is no 
reason to think female freedom might necessarily involve any discernible difference from 
male freedom.  Was not the claim to an unqualified freedom also liberalism's raison 
d'être?  Was not feminism's response that this is a fantasy, and that oppression against 
women gives lie to it and must be addressed in order for them to share in it?  Was not 
what made feminism in all its various waves feminism as such was that it represented a 
claim to freedom that was also necessarily a claim to justice for women?   
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 We can see that the CRC attempts to show in their Statement that feminism qua 
feminism does more than just make an unqualified claim to participation and 
nondomination.  It names the interlocking systems of oppressions which shape (qualify?) 
the space in which such an unqualified claim gets heard.  Moreover, their vision is 
arguably more Arendtian, more expansive, than the Milan Collective, because they 
address their claims not just to other women, but to all human beings.  Their argument is 
precisely that they cannot settle for a politics of claims only addressed to and from 
women, because the oppression named by feminism does not even affect all women 
equally, and that black women suffered from interlocking oppressions that had left them 
voiceless.  They state: 
Although we are feminists and lesbians, we feel solidarity with progressive Black 
men and do not advocate the factionalization that white women who are 
separatists demand … We struggle together with Black men against racism, while 
we also struggle with Black men about sexism.  (CRC 213) 
 
Thus the origin of their claim was to have a claim, a distinct perspective that mattered, 
and to not be taken for granted as corollaries or adjuncts of civil rights, black power, 
feminist, or socialist politics.  Politics for the CRC requires more than just participation in 
public affairs and non-domination, it involves the subversion of existing power relations 
across the political field in which their claim appears.  It is a maneuvering that attempts 
to break into the field of consciousness of all women and men. 
 
 
Feminist Political Power 
 The Combahee River Collective Statement does inaugurate a politics of identity, 
but if read carefully, we see their claim was not just to a politics of identity or identity 
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difference.  Instead of this, or just this, it was a claim to a justifiable autonomy within a 
discursive political space that is already shaped by (often unspoken) hegemonic and 
dominating identities.  For instance, in reference to lesbian separatism they argue that 
“As Black women we find any type of biological determinism a particularly dangerous 
and reactionary basis upon which to build a politic” (214).  Moreover they argue:  
We believe that sexual politics under patriarchy is as pervasive in Black women's 
lives as are the politics of class and race.  We also find it difficult to separate race 
from class from sex oppression because in our lives they are most often 
experienced simultaneously.  We know that there is such a thing as racial-sexual 
oppression which is neither solely racial nor solely sexual ...” (213) 
 
Both of these selections show that the CRC understood well the fluidity and contingency 
of identity.  They did not believe in biological essentialism, and they could tell that 
building a politics based solely on one identity would fail them.  However, they also 
understood, the way identity carried with it real implications (often oppressive and 
limiting) for their lives and that identity politics was concerned with the vagaries of these 
implications.  A better history of second wave feminism might show that while they 
called for a feminist epistemology, this epistemology was not fundamentally essentialist 
but historicist, taking different forms at different times.  Furthermore, this analysis would 
show that second-wave feminism did not believe that it was premised on a stable 
category of women, but that it was in fact premised on the first-order politics to which 
Zerilli claims a desire to return.  Theirs was a first-order political claim to a feminist 
politics premised on a shared judgment of politicized social relations.   
 The work of Michel Foucault is quite helpful here.  While Catherine MacKinnon 
is quite right to critique him for his relative inattention to the question of gender and the 
way it differentiates the discursive power of constructs like sexuality (a lacunae which 
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Judith Butler would later attempt to fill), she is nonetheless quite right to praise him for 
using questions of “method, power, class, and the law” as sites of analysis in the 
construction of discourse (MacKinnon 1989: 288).  With Foucault, we can imagine how 
feminist political power is not just expressed when women and allies coming together in 
public action, but that it is also expressed when it names itself alongside powers already 
extant in the field of politics.  Zerilli herself makes note of this aspect of Foucault's 
thought in two regards.  First, she says that the Arendtian use of the term power (as that 
which maintains the space of appearance through action with others) is done not to deny 
other types of power (as domination or discursively interconnected relationships) but to 
emphasize both the fragility and the limitless possibility of political action understood as 
plural and nonsovereign (Zerilli 2005: 21).7  Second, she is critical of Foucault's response 
to the discursive notion of power, what he calls a “practice of freedom,” which prepares 
subjects to a critical awareness of their own subjectivity.  She sees this proposal as 
misguided in that it merely continues “the Western tradition's … displacement of political 
freedom as a relation of the world and to others” (15).   
 I see Foucault as being helpful despite these critiques.  To briefly respond, I think 
it is clear that identity politics is non-sovereign in precisely the way Zerilli wishes that it 
be.  This is because epistemological perspectives still rely on first order political 
judgments about the world, judgments can be met with assent or dissent.  This is clear in 
reading any number of political theorists who provide epistemological perspectives and 
yet maintain that they are not dogma (cf. Marx, Foucault, and MacKinnon).  It is also 
                                                            
7 I do not have the space here to object to the characterization of the public sphere as wholly dependent 
on action-power, but I think that Patchen Markell makes the case that responsive spectators are equally 
important to the public sphere in his article “The Rule of the People,” in The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 100, No. 1 (Feb. 2006) pp. 1-14. 
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clear that while Foucault does declare the care for the self as ontologically prior to the 
care for others, he believes it is necessary in order to live ethically and thus freely.  Ethics 
is the conscious practice of freedom on his account, and it is used in order to combat the 
question of subjectivity to which Zerilli sees him as being captive (Foucault 2003: 28-
29).  Foucault's interpretation of the Greeks distinguishes him from Arendt and Zerilli.  
He says “The Greeks problematized their freedom, and the freedom of the individual, as 
an ethical problem” (29).  He goes on to say, “[Freedom] was a mode of being for the 
subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way visible to others … extensive work by 
the self on the self is required for this practice of freedom to take shape” (29).  Moreover 
and contrary to what Zerilli claims, this care of the self is not done in isolation; it is not 
only “relevant to solitary individuals” (Zerilli 2005: 15).  Instead, Foucault argues that 
this care of the self, this ethical practice of freedom, is a “true social practice” which 
utilizes not only “schools, lectures, and professionals of spiritual direction,” but also 
“relations of kinship, friendship, and obligation” (Foucault 1986: 51-53).   
 Here we can see how identity politics of the sort practiced by the Combahee River 
Collective was integral in helping them develop not only strategies for liberation from 
domination but also practices of freedom which would be able to guard against the 
solidification of discursive power relationships.  It was precisely through the experience 
of their identity as multiply oppressed that they were led to critical stances towards the 
often patriarchal Civil Rights/Black Power movement, the often racist feminist 
movement, and the often race- and gender-blind analyses of the socialist movement.  It 
was precisely out of these experiences that consciousness-raising was different for them, 
that  it lent itself to a more radical politics that saw oppressions as interlocking.  Their 
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practice of freedom was different from the Milan Collective's, because they were in a 
position to recognize the dangers of the power involved even in supposedly non-
sovereign political judgment.8  Zerilli's Arendtian perspective, which conceives of a 
fundamental plurality amongst human beings but assumes a fundamental unity of the 
common world, does not recognize this aspect of identity politics.  It does not perceive 
how our common world can be fractured along fault lines of race, gender, and class and 
where voices who wish to participate are left out, dismissed, unheard over the din of the 
majority. 
 
 
A Vindication of Identity Politics 
 This paper has been about identity politics.  Do we see claims arising from 
identity groups as primarily expressions of freedom or expressions of justice?  Zerilli's 
argument is that by looking at these expressions primarily in terms of freedom, a freedom 
enacted by making such claims in a community of others, we can sidestep definitional 
questions about what it means to be such-and-such identity group.  Defining what it 
means to be woman, black, white, gay, or straight, simply gets iterated and reiterated in a 
call and response of political judgments.  In so arguing, Zerilli implies that if we 
presuppose identity claims as claims to a certain type of social justice we risk balkanizing 
our political world, losing sight of the precious ungrounded ground of democratic 
politics, and fragmenting what could be vibrant coalitions of diverse freedom enactors.  
This is because she sees claims to justice by identity groups as operating fundamentally 
                                                            
8 Foucault states in “The Genealogy of Ethics” that power is not evil, but “everything is dangerous” and 
requires us to be vigilant. 
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within an economy of recrimination and reparation that ossifies certain types of identities 
(the wretch, the victim) at the expense of other, more freedom-affirming ones and that 
such an economy is not fundamentally political but instead a rule-governed system of 
exchange which merely serves to reinscribe the status quo.  Recourse to arguments about 
social justice obscures the ways in which freedom must be remain unqualified, lest it be 
displaced by justifications (Zerilli 2005: 6)  
 My argument has been that seeing claims to an identity or from an identity as a 
question of fundamental freedom overlooks the way in which political power operates 
both as action (as Zerilli and Arendt use the term) and as discursive power relations, “a 
set of actions upon other actions” (as Foucault insists).9  The CRC recognize the first way 
political power can be constituted, through organizing.  They state that “During our years 
together as a Black feminist collective we have experienced success and defeat and, joy 
and pain, victory and failure.” (CRC 214).  They then point out the limitations of this in 
terms of the second way political power operates, by pointing out the difficulties they 
have faced.  Here they state: 
“The major source of difficulty in our political work is that we are not just trying 
to fight oppression on one front or even two, but instead to address a whole range 
of oppressions.  We do not have racial, sexual, heterosexual, or class privilege to 
rely upon, nor do we have even the minimal access to resources and power that 
groups who possess any one of these types of privilege have.” (214) 
 
When we think of what is political in this way we can better understand why identity 
claims can then be seen as both enacting freedom, the freedom to enact a particular 
politics, and as enacting justice, enabling a more equitable space in which to make claims 
within the political power structures that always already exist.  In this sense the 
                                                            
9 Foucault, Michel. “The Subject and Power” in Faubion, James, ed., Power (New York: The New Press, 
2000). p. 341 
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Combahee River Collective was making a political claim to have a claim, to have their 
own perspective.  They make an unqualified claim to political participation (to be 
autonomous, levelly human), but they make it in a space that must be qualified in order 
for their claim to be heard as such within the matrices of power that exist.  They are 
qualifying the space in which the claim is made, not the claim itself.  They are not 
presenting their perspective as objective truth, but as subjective experiences which serve, 
much like the figuration employed by the Milan Collective, as examples (not rules) of an 
epistemic vantage point, a shared political judgment about the character of the political 
space in which they act.   
 In this sense identity politics is politics on the sort that Arendt and Zerilli 
envision.  Although some who have claimed the mantle of identity of politics as 
inaugurated by the Combahee River Collective may have appropriated it unfairly, and 
although some commentaries have likewise characterized it unfairly, their form of 
identity politics is radical and profound.  And, moreover, it is effective.  It has worked.   
In a piece titled “Coalition Politics: Turning the Century” Bernice Johnson Reagon makes 
this point very effectively.10  Recounting an interview she had seen with Jane Pauley and 
an author bemoaning the lost possibilities of the 60s-era protest movements, she quotes 
Pauley as asking, “Where did we go wrong?”  Johnson then tells her audience:    
“And I say, You fool.  You wouldn't be up on the Today show to even ask the 
question, if we had gone wrong!  We have not gone wrong! … Any of you who 
have jobs that your mama didn't have, we did that.  Nobody else did that!! It is a 
very good time to be alive – to be in this place, complete with its racism, and its 
classism, and its garbage trucks running through.” (354) 
 
When we see identity politics as the recognition of identities as a means to level the 
                                                            
10 Reagon, Bernice Johnson. “Coalition Politics: Turning the Century” in Smith, Barbara, ed. Home Girls: 
A Black Feminist Anthology (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000) p. 354 
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always already disparate field of politics, not in order to preserve the identities but to 
equalize their effects, we can see that it has been quite fruitful.  Far from contaminating 
the political sphere with social questions (such as Arendt feared), or holding us captive to 
symbolic figurations of injury and recrimination (such as Zerilli laments), identity politics 
creates a space for political discourse that did not exist prior, and it allows political 
claims to be heard from voices which had been drowned out.  Identity politics, feminist 
or otherwise, frees us from silence, allows us to be “all of who [we are] in the same 
place.” 
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